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Abstract
We clarify the status of log-periodicity associated with speculative bubbles preceding financial
crashes. In particular, we address Feigenbaum’s [2001] criticism and show how it can be rebuked.
Feigenbaum’s main result is as follows: “the hypothesis that the log-periodic component is present in
the data cannot be rejected at the 95% confidence level when using all the data prior to the 1987 crash;
however, it can be rejected by removing the last year of data.” (e.g., by removing 15% of the data closest
to the critical point). We stress that it is naive to analyze a critical point phenomenon, i.e., a power law
divergence, reliably by removing the most important part of the data closest to the critical point. We
also present the history of log-periodicity in the present context explaining its essential features and why
it may be important. We offer an extension of the rational expectation bubble model for general and
arbitrary risk-aversion within the general stochastic discount factor theory. We suggest guidelines for
using log-periodicity and explain how to develop and interpret statistical tests of log-periodicity. We
discuss the issue of prediction based on our results and the evidence of outliers in the distribution of
drawdowns. New statistical tests demonstrate that the 1% to 10% quantile of the largest events of the
population of drawdowns of the Nasdaq composite index and of the Dow Jones Industrial Average index
belong to a distribution significantly different from the rest of the population. This suggests that very
large drawdowns result from an amplification mechanism that may make them more predictable than
smaller market moves.
1 Introduction
A market crash occurring simultaneously on the large majority of the worlds stock markets, as witnessed
in Oct. 1987, amounts to a quasi-instantaneous evaporation of trillions of dollars. In present values (June.
2001), a worldwide stock market crash of 30% indeed would correspond to an absolute loss of about 13
trillion dollars! Market crashes can thus swallow years of pension and savings in an instant. Could they
make us suffer even more by being the precursors or triggering factors of major recessions as in 1929-33
after the great crash of Oct. 1929? Or could they lead to a general collapse of the financial and banking
system as seems to have being barely avoided several times in the not-so-distant past?
Stock market crashes are also fascinating because they personify the class of phenomena known as
“extreme events”. Extreme events are characteristic of many natural and social systems, often refered to
by scientists as “complex systems”.
Here, we present an up-to-date synthesis of the status of the concept proposed several years ago
[Sornette et al., 1996] that market crashes are preceded by specific log-periodic patterns developing years
in advance. Section 2 summarizes how this theory of logperiodic crash precursors emerged. Section 3
explains that log-periodicity is associated with the symmetry of discrete scale invariance. Section 4
stresses the importance of log-periodicity to help constraining the future path of stock markets. Section
5 extends our previous formulation of the rational expectation bubble model of stock prices preceeding
crashes to the case of arbitrary risk aversion. Section 6 clarifies the distinction between unconditional
(ensemble average) and conditional (specific price trajectory) returns to explain how the bubble price and
probability of crashes are intertwinned. Section 7 presents figures summarizing the empirical evidence
for log-periodicity as well as nine new cases. Section 8 offers a brief “log-periodicity user’s guideline”.
Section 9 summarizes previously developed statistical tests of log-periodicity. Section 10 discusses crash
prediction using log-periodicity, presents a new statistical test on the Hong Kong index and provides a
quantitative formula to assess the statistical significance of a given prediction track record using the crash
“roulette”. Section 10 also discusses some implications of crash prediction and presents an up-to-date
assessement of a prediction on the Nikkei index issued in Jan. 1999. Section 11 discusses the problem
of charaterizing very large drawdowns (cumulative losses) as outliers. A novel maximum likelihood
testing approach is presented which confirms the proposal that very large losses belong to a different
distribution and may result from an amplifying mechanism. Section 12 concludes.
2 A little history along the way
To complement the alphabetical listing of the contributors to the literature on log-periodicity concerned
with stock market crashes [Feigenbaum, 2001], let us recall a little bit of history.
The search for log-periodicity in real data started in 1991. While working on the exciting challenge
of predicting the failure of pressure tanks made of kevlar-matrix and carbon-matrix composites constitut-
ing essential elements of the European Ariane IV and V rockets and also used in satellites for propulsion,
one of us (DS) realized that the rupture of complex composite material structures could be understood as
a cooperative phenomenon leading to specific detectable critical signatures. The power laws and asso-
ciated complex exponents and log-periodic patterns discovered in this context and published only much
later [Anifrani et al., 1995], were found to perform quite reliably [Anifrani et al., 1999] for prediction
purposes. The concept that rupture in heterogeneous material is critical has since been confirmed by a
series of numerical [Sahimi and Arbabi, 1996; Johansen and Sornette, 1998a] and experimental works
[Garcimartin et al., 1997; Guarino et al., 1998; 1999; Johansen and Sornette, 2000a; Sobolev and Tyup-
kin, 2000]. A prediction algorithm has been patented and is now used routinely on these pressure tanks
as a standard qualifying procedure.
In 1995, the extension of this concept to earthquakes was proposed by Sornette and Sammis [1995]
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(see also [Newman et al., 1995] who elaborated on this idea using a hierarchical fiber bundle model).
This suggestion was consolidated on chemical precursors to the Jan. 1995 Kobe earthquake [Johansen
et al., 1996; 2000a] and has since been analyzed rather thoroughly [Saleur et al., 1996; Huang et al.,
2000a; 2000b; Main et al., 2000; Sobolev and Tyupkin, 2000]. Here, the evidence is perhaps even more
controversial than in the financial context, as earthquake data are complex, spatio-temporal and sparse.
This journal is not the place for a debate on the application to earthquakes which is left for another
audience.
At approximately the same time as the extension to earthquakes was proposed, Feigenbaum and Fre-
und [1996] and Sornette et al. [1996] independently suggested that essentially the same concept should
also apply to large financial crashes. Since then, we and collaborators [Johansen, 1997; Sornette and
Johansen, 1997; 1998a; Johansen and Sornette, 1999a; 1999b; 1999c; 2000b; 2000c; 2001a; Johansen
et al., 1999; 2000b] and other groups [Vandewalle et al., 1998a; 1998b; 1999; Gluzman and Yukalov,
1998; Feigenbaum and Freund, 1998; Drozdz et al., 1999] have reported a large number of cases as
well as provided an underlying theoretical framework based on the economic framework of rational
expectation (RE) bubbles (see [Sornette and Malevergne, 2001] for a recent synthesis on RE bubbles
and Canessa [2000] for a different theoretical route). The yet most complete compilation of “crashes as
critical points” has been published in [Johansen et al., 1999; Johansen and Sornette, 1999; 2001a].
3 Status of log-periodicity
First, let us stress what is not log-periodicity: it is not a specific signature of a critical point in the same
way that scale invariance is not a specific property of second order phase transitions. True, systems at
their critical point are endowed with the symmetry of scale invariance. However, a system exhibiting
the symmetry of scale invariance is not necessarily at a critical point [Dubrulle et al., 1997]. In the
same way, a certain class of systems at their critical points exhibit log-periodicity. The converse is not
true: there are many systems far from criticality which nevertheless have log-periodic behaviors (see
[Sornette, 1998] for a review).
Log-periodicity is an observable signature of the symmetry of a discrete scale invariance (DSI). DSI
is a weaker symmetry than (continuous) scale invariance. The latter is the symmetry of a system which
manifests itself such that an observable O (x) as a function of the “control” parameter x is scale invariant
under the change x→ λx for arbitrary λ, i.e., a number µ (λ) exists such that
O(x) = µ (λ)O(λx) . (1)
The solution of (1) is simply a power law O(x) = xα, with α = − log µ
log λ , which can be verified directly
by insertion. In DSI, the system or the observable obeys scale invariance (1) only for specific choices of
the magnification factor λ, which form in general an infinite but countable set of values λ1, λ2, ... that
can be written as λn = λn. λ is the fundamental scaling ratio determining the period of the resulting
log-periodicity. This property can be qualitatively seen to encode a lacunarity of the fractal structure.
The most general solution of (1) with λ (and therefore µ) is
O(x) = xα P
(
lnx
lnλ
)
(2)
where P (y) is an arbitrary periodic function of period 1 in the argument, hence the name log-periodicity.
Expanding it in Fourier series
∑∞
n=−∞ cn exp
(
2nπi lnx
lnλ
)
, we see that O(x) becomes a sum of power
laws with the infinitely discrete spectrum of complex exponents αn = α + i2πn/ ln λ, where n is an
arbitrary integer. Thus, DSI leads to power laws with complex exponents, whose observable signature
is log-periodicity. Specifically, for financial bubbles prior to large crashes, it has been established that a
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first order representation of eq. (2)
I (t) = A+B (tc − t)β +C (tc − t)β cos (ω ln (tc − t)− φ) (3)
captures well the behaviour of the market price I (t) prior to a crash or large correction at a time ≈ tc.
There are many mechanisms known to generate log-periodicity [Sornette, 1998]. Let us stress that
various dynamical mechanisms generate log-periodicity, without relying on a pre-existing discrete hi-
erarchical structure. Thus, DSI may be produced dynamically (see in particular the recent nonlinear
dynamical model introduced in [Ide and Sornette, 2001; Sornette and Ide, 2001]) and does not need to
be pre-determined by e.g., a geometrical network. This is because there are many ways to break a sym-
metry, the subtlety here being to break it only partially. Thus, log-periodicity per se is not a signature of
a critical point. Only within a well-defined model and mechanism can it be used as a potential signature.
If log-periodicity is present at certain times in financial data then, without any more information, this
only suggests that these periods of time present a kind of scale invariance in their time evolution (we are
not referring here to the power law tails of returns [Mandelbrot, 1963; de Vries, 1994; Mantegna and
Stanley, 1995; Gopikrishnan et al., 1998], which is a completely different property).
4 Why should we be interested in log-periodicity?
Feigenbaum[2001] writes: “[...] log-periodic oscillations [...] would obviously be of practical value
to financial economists if they could use these oscillations to forecast an upcoming crash.” What an
understatement!
Predictions of trend-reversals or changes of regime is the focus of most forecast efforts in essen-
tially all domains of applications, such as in economy, finance, weather, climate, etc. However, it is
noteworthy difficult and unreliable. It is possibly the most difficult challenge and arguably the most in-
teresting. It may be useful to recall that in the 1970’s there was a growing concern among scientists and
government agencies that the earth was cooling down and might enter a new ice-age similar to the pre-
vious little 1400-1800 ice-age or even worse (M. Ghil, private communication and see [Budyko, 1969;
Sellers, 1969; US Committee of the Global Atmospheric Research Program, 1975; Ghil and Childress,
1987])! Now that global warming is almost universally recognized, this indeed shows how short-sighted
predictions are! The situation is essentially the same nowadays: estimations of future slight changes of
economic growth rates are rather good but predictions of recessions and of crashes are utterly unreli-
able. The almost overwhelming consensus on the reality and magnitude of global warming is based on
a clear trend over the 20’th century that has finally emerged above the uncertainty level. We stress that
this consensus is not based on the prediction of a trend reversal or a cahnge of regime. In other words,
scientists are good at recognizing a trend once already deeply immersed in it: we needed a century of
data to extract a clear signal of a trend on global warming. In contrast, the techniques presently available
to scientists are bad at predicting most changes of regime.
In economy and finance, the situation is even worse as the people’s expectation of the future, their
greediness and fear all intertwine in the construction process of the indeterminate future. On the question
of prediction, Federal Reserve A. Greenspan said “Learn everything you can, collect all the data, crunch
all the numbers before making a prediction or a financial forecast. Even then, accept and understand
that nobody can predict the future when people are involved. Human behavior hasn’t changed; people
are unpredictable. If you’re wrong, correct your mistake and move on.” The fuzziness resulting from
the role played by the expectation and discount of the future on present investor decisions is captured
by another famous quote from A. Greenspan before the Senate Banking Committee, June 20, 1995:
“If I say something which you understand fully in this regard, I probably made a mistake.” In this
perspective, our suggestion that financial time series might contain useful information of changes of
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regimes, reflecting a possible collective emergent behavior deserve careful attention for its numerous
implications and applications.
There is another related reason why log-periodicity might be important. The fundamental valuation
theory provides a rational expectation estimation of the price of an asset as the present discounted value
of all future incomes derived from this asset. However, one of the most enduring problem in finance
is that observed prices seem to deviate significantly and over extended time intervals from fundamental
prices. To address this problem, Blanchard [1979] and Blanchard and Watson [1982] introduced the con-
cept of rational expectation (RE) bubbles, which allow for arbitrary deviations from fundamental prices
while keeping the fundamental anchor point of economic modeling. An important practical problem is
to detect such bubbles, if they exist, as they probably constitute one of the most important empirical fact
to explain and predict their financial impacts (potential losses of up to trillions of dollars during crashes
and recession following these bubbles). A large literature has indeed emerged on theoretical refinements
of the original concept and on the empirical detectability of RE bubbles in financial data (see [Camerer,
1989] and [Adam and Szafarz, 1992] for a survey). Empirical research has largely been concentrated on
testing for explosive trends in the time series of asset prices and foreign exchange rates [Evans, 1991;
Woo, 1987], however with limited success. The first reason lies in the absence of a general definition,
as bubbles are model specific and generally defined from a rather restrictive framework. The concept of
a fundamental price reference does not necessarily exist, nor is it necessarily unique. Many RE bubbles
exhibit shapes that are hard to reconcile with the economic intuition or facts [Lux and Sornette, 2001].
A major problem is that the apparent evidence for bubbles can be re-interpreted in terms of market fun-
damentals that are unobserved by the researcher. Another suggestion is that, if stock prices are not more
explosive than dividends, then it can be concluded that rational bubbles are not present, since bubbles
are taken to generate an explosive component to stock prices. However, periodically collapsing bubbles
are not detectable by using standard tests to determine whether stock prices are more explosive or less
stationary than dividends [Evans, 1991]. In sum, the present evidence for speculative bubbles is fuzzy
and unresolved at best, according to the standard economic and econometric literature.
The suggestion that log-periodicity may be associated with bubbles would thus provide a tool for
their characterization and detection. In other words, we offer the suggestion that the conundrum of
bubble definition and detection could be resolved by using the log-periodic power law structures as one
of the qualifying signatures.
5 The rational expectation bubble model with risk aversion
In his section 2, Feigenbaum [2001] summarizes accurately our rational expectation bubble theory [Jo-
hansen and Sornette, 1999a; Johansen et al., 1999; 2000b]. However, he suggests that it might not be
robust within a general formulation of risk aversion. We now show that it is actually robust by solving the
corresponding no-arbitrage condition within the general stochastic pricing kernel framework [Cochrane,
2001] used by Feigenbaum [2001].
We already gave [Johansen et al., 1999] two ways of incorporating risk aversion into our model. The
first one consists in introducing a risk premium rate r ∈ (0, 1] such that the no-arbitrage condition on
the bubble price reads
(1− rdt)Et[p(t+ dt)] = p(t) , (4)
where Et[y] denotes the expectation of y conditioned on the whole past history up to time t. Let us write
the bubble price equation as (equation (7) in [Feigenbaum, 2001])
dp
p
= µ(t)dt+ σ(t)dW − κdj , (5)
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where dW is the increment of a random walk with no drift and unit variance, and dj is the jump process
equal to 0 in absence of a crash and equal to 1 when a crash occurs. The crash hazard rate h(t) is given
by Et[dj] = h(t)dt by definition. The condition (4) gives µ − r = κh(t). The introduction of the risk
aversion rate r has only the effect of multiplying the price by a constant factor and does not change the
results.
Another way to incorporate risk aversion is to say that the probability of a crash in the next instant
is perceived by traders as being K times bigger than it objectively is. This amounts to multiplying the
crash hazard rate h(t) by K and therefore does not either modify the structure of h(t).
The coefficients r and K both represent general aversion of fixed magnitude against risks. Risk
aversion is a central feature of economic theory and is generally thought to be stable within a reason-
able range being associated with slow-moving secular trends like changes in education, social structures
and technology. Risk perceptions are however constantly changing in the course of real-life bubbles.
This is indeed captures by our model in which risk perceptions quantified by h(t) do oscillate dramati-
cally throughout the bubble, even though subjective aversion to risk remains stable, simply because the
objective degree of risk that the bubble may burst goes through wild swings.
The theory of stochastic pricing kernel [Cochrane, 2001] provides a unified framework for pricing
consistently all assets under the premise that price equals expected discounted payoff, while capturing
the macro-economic risks underlying each security’s value. This theory basically amounts to postulating
the existence of a stochastic discount factor (SDF) M that allows one to price all assets. The SDF is
also termed the pricing kernel, the pricing operator, or the state price density and can be thought of as
the nominal, inter-temporal, marginal rate of substitution for consumption of a representative agent in
an exchange economy. Under an adequate definition of the space of admissible trading strategies, the
product of the SDF with the value process of any admissible self-financing trading strategy implemented
by trading on financial, p, must be a martingale:
M(t)p(t) = Et
[
p(t′)M(t′)
]
, (6)
(where t′ refers to a future date), for no arbitrage opportunities to exist. In the notation of Feigenbaum
[2001], ρ(t′) = M(t′)/M(t). Expression (6) is much more general than (4) and recovers it for M(t) =
ert corresponding to a constant discount rate. The no-arbitrage condition (6) expresses that pM is a
martingale for any admissible price p. Technically, this amounts to imposing that the drift of pM is zero.
To make further progress, we assume the following general dynamics for the SDF
dM(t)
M(t)
= −r(t) dt− φ(t) dW (t)− g(t)dWˆ . (7)
The drift −r(t) of M is justified by the well-known martingale condition on the product of the bank
account and the SDF [Cochrane, 2001]. Intuitively, it retrieves the usual simple form of exponential
discount with time. The process φ denotes the market price of risk, as measured by the covariance of
asset returns with the SDF. Stated differently, φ is the excess return over the spot interest rate that assets
must earn per unit of covariance with W . The last term −g(t)dWˆ embodies all other stochastic factors
acting on the SDF, which are orthogonal to the stochastic process dW . Writing that the process pM is a
martingale and applying Ito’s calculus gives the following equation
µ(t)− r(t) = κh(t) + σ(t)φ(t) , (8)
where we have used that Et[dWˆ ] = 0 = Et[dW · dWˆ ]. The case r(t) = φ(t) = 0 recovers our
previous formulation (equation (9) of [Feigenbaum, 2001]). The expected price conditioned on no crash
occurring (dj = 0) is obtained by integrating (5) with (8)
Et0 [p(t)] = p(t0)L(t) exp
(
κ
∫ t
t0
dτh(τ)
)
, (9)
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where
L(t) = exp
(∫ t
t0
dτ [r(τ) + σ(τ)φ(τ)]
)
. (10)
For r(t) = φ(t) = 0, L(t) = 1, we recover our previous result [Johansen and Sornette, 1999a; Johansen
et al., 1999; 2000b]. Expression (9) shows how the possible log-periodic structures carried by the crash
hazard rate h(t) can be distorted by the SDF. It is worth noting that the log-periodic signal κ
∫ t
t0
dτh(τ),
if present, does not disappear. Only a possibly noisy signal lnL(t) is added to it. The problem is then
to detect a regular (log-periodic) oscillation embedded within a noisy signal. For this, we have proposed
the powerful Lomb spectral analysis in the variable ln tc − t [Johansen et al., 1999], where tc is the
critical time corresponding to the theoretical end of the bubble.
We thus see that the most general form of risk aversion does not invalidate our theory. We note
in passing that the SDF is not different from one agent to the next, as argued by Feigenbaum [2001],
because it described the aggregate perception by the rational agents of the level of risks [Cochrane,
2001].
6 Average returns versus conditional returns
In several instances in his article, Feigenbaum stresses that our model disallows any positive profit,
because we use the no-arbitrage condition. The same error has been made previously by Ilinsky [1999].
Their argument is basically that the martingale condition (6) leads to a model which “assumes a zero
return as the best prediction for the market.” Ilinsky in particular continues with “No need to say that
this is not what one expects from a perfect model of market bubble! Buying shares, traders expect the
price to rise and it is reflected (or caused) by their prediction model. They support the bubble and the
bubble supports them!”. In other words, Feigenbaum and Ilinsky criticize a key economic hypothesis of
our model: market rationality.
This misunderstanding addresses a rather subtle point of the model and stems from the difference
between two different types of returns :
1. the unconditional return is indeed zero as seen from (4) or (6) and reflects the fair game condition.
2. The conditional return µ(t), conditioned upon no crash occurring between time t and time t′, is
non-zero and is given by (8). If the crash hazard rate is increasing with time, the conditional return
will be accelerating precisely because the crash becomes more probable and the investors must be
remunerated for their higher risk in order to participate in the continuation of the bubble.
The vanishing unconditional average return takes into account the probability that the market may
crash. Therefore, conditionally on staying in the bubble (no crash yet), the market must rationally rise
to compensate buyers for having taken the risk that the market could have crashed.
Our model thus allows (conditional) profits. Only when summing over many bubbles and many
crashes will these profits average out to zero. As a consequence, it is possible to construct trading
strategies to test for the existence of abnormal profit. This has been done with positive results (Lin., P.
and Ledoit. O., 1999, private communication).
7 Log-periodic bubbles prior to crashes
In figures 1 to 3, we show a spectral analysis of the log-periodic component of all previously identified
and published log-periodic bubbles prior to crashes on the major financial markets as well as nine new
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cases for completeness∗ .
These new cases consist in
1. two crashes on currencies, the Yen versus Euro (expressed in Deutsch mark) mini-crash with a
drop of more than 7% on Jan. 2000 and the US$ versus Euro event (expressed in Deutsch mark)
with a drop of more than 13% on Oct. 2000;
2. two crashes of the DJIA and SP500 on the US market in early 1937 and in mid-1946;
3. five crashes of the Heng Seng index of the Hong Kong market, of April 1989, Nov. 1980, Sept.
1978, Feb. 1973 and Oct. 1971, which complement the three crashes on Oct. 1987, Jan. 1994
and Oct. 1997 previously reported in [Johansen and Sornette 2001a]. The positions of these five
crashes are pointed out in figure 13 which presents the Hang-Seng composite index from Nov.
1969 to Sept. 1999.
The fits with the log-periodic formula (3) to these nine new cases are shown in figures 4 to 12. Five
of them are the first four bubbles on the Hang-Seng index ending respectively in Oct. 1971, in Feb, 1973,
in Sept. 1978 and in Oct. 1980 plus one additional event ending in April 1989. Among these five events
of the Hong Kong market, the first (Oct. 1971), third (Sept. 1978) and fifth (April 1989) are significantly
weaker than all the others and occur over time periods shorter than most of the previous ones, hence we
expect the recovery of the log-periodic parameters, and in particular of the angular log-frequency ω, to
be less precise.
Consistently, all twenty cases (8 crashes on the sole Hong Kong market, 6 crashes on the major stock
markets and 6 crashes on currencies) point to a log-periodic component in the evolution of the market
price with a log-frequency ω/2π ≈ 1.1±0.2 except for the two first Hong-Kong cases of 1971 and 1973
and the crash of April 1989 where the value for ω is slightly lower/higher. Furthermore, as can be seen in
the captions of figures 4 to 9 for the nine new cases and in [Johansen et al., 1999; Johansen and Sornette,
1999; 2001a] for the previously published cases, the value of the exponent β is remarkably consistent
found around ≈ 0.35 ± 0.15, however with larger fluctuations than for ω. Of the twenty large crashes
in major financial markets of the 20th century, seventeen occurred in the past ≈ 30 years, suggesting an
increasing strength of collective and herding behavior over time. That these twenty large crashes show
such consistent values for the two meaningful parameters β and especially ω as well as the timing tc
of the crash is needless to say quite remarkable. The reader is reminded that many more cases, such as
the Russian bubble followed by a crash in 1997 which was erronously postulated by Ilinski [Ilinski, K.
1999] not to contain any log-periodic component, and on several emergent markets have been identified
[Johansen et al., 1999; Johansen and Sornette, 1999; 2001a].
8 Log-periodicity user’s guidelines
We are obviously not going to divulge our technique and methodology for crash prediction but instead
offer a few common sense guidelines to avoid the rather obvious traps in which Feigenbaum [2001] has
fallen.
The first important observation is the rather large degeneracy of the search landscape of the fit of
the data by equation (22) in [Feigenbaum, 2001]. Feigenbaum presents the two best solutions to the
fit of the logarithm of the price of the SP500 index prior to the Oct. 1987 crash in his figures 3 and
4. These two solutions tell quite different stories. We just note here that we would have rejected the
solution of his figure 4 as the angular log-frequency ω = 2.24 is very small, corresponding to a huge
∗The Yen versus DM mini-crash was in fact presented by one of us (AJ) at a talk on the Niels Bohr Inst. on 3. Jan. 2000, i.e.,
prior to the actual date of the mini-crash. Thus the talk formally constitutes a prediction of the mini-crash. The evidence on the
two crashes on Wall Street in 1937 and 1946 was presented at a talk at the investment company PIMCO, Newport Beach in May
2000.
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preferred scaling ratio λ = 16.5. In addition, the exponent β is larger than 1, which as recalled correctly
by Feigenbaum is a calibrating constraint. In such complex search problems, the root-mean-square and
R2 statistics are not very discriminating and should not be taken as the first filters, as already explained
in our previous publications. An obvious technical reason is that the errors or fluctuations around the
log-periodic component are not Gaussian and instead exhibit fat tails, reflecting those of the distribution
function of returns [Mandelbrot, 1963; de Vries, 1994; Mantegna and Stanley, 1995; Gopikrishnan et al.,
1998]. We also disagree with Feigenbaum when he writes “we are not consistently estimating physical
parameters”. Indeed, β and especially ω carries a lot of relevant information as shown by the Lomb
peridograms the log-periodic oscillations in [Johansen et al 1999].
Among the five examples presented in table 1 of [Feigenbaum, 2001], three (1987, 1997† and 1998)
are consistent with our and other authors’ previous results. The 1974 case could be called an “anti-
bubble” ending in a large positive correction or drawup, an “anti-crash”. We have observed several other
similar anti-bubbles [Johansen and Sornette, 1999c], some ending in such an “anti-crash” (this will be
reported elsewhere). The case that Feigenbaum makes with the 1985 event for suggesting the absence
of any discriminating power of log-periodicity is easily dismissed: we would never qualify it since its
exponent β = 3.53 is much too large. We stress that it is an all too common behavior to dismiss lightly
a serious hypothesis by not taking the trouble to learn the relevant skills necessary to test it rigorously,
as for example in [Laloux et al., 1999].
9 How to develop and interpret statistical tests of log-
periodicity
With respect to the possible selection bias of fitted time intervals, we stress that we already addressed
specifically this question [Johansen et al., 2000b]. For completeness and courtesy to the reader, we
summarize our results. We picked at random fifty 400-week intervals in the period 1910 to 1996 of the
logarithm of the Dow Jones Industrial Average and launched the same fitting procedure as done for the
1987 and 1929 crashes. The end-date of the 50 data sets are given in [Johansen et al., 2000b]. Of the 11
fits with a root-mean-square comparable with that of the two crashes, only 6 data sets produced values
for β, ω and ∆t which were in the same range as the values obtained for the 2 crashes, specifically
0.45 < β < 0.85, 4 < ω < 14 (1.6 < λ < 4.8) and 3 < ∆t < 16. All 6 fits belonged to the
periods prior to the crashes of 1929, 1962 and 1987. The existence of a “slow” crash in 1962 was
before these results unknown to us and the identification of this crash naturally strengthens our case.
(A systematic unpublished prediction scheme used on 20 years of the Hang-Seng index also detected
a crash unknown to us in the second half of 1981, see section 10.2). Thus, the results from fitting
the surrogate data sets generated from the real stock market index show that fits, which in terms of
the fitting parameters corresponds to the three crashes of 1929, 1962 and 1987, are not likely to occur
“accidentally”. Actually, Feigenbaum also notes “Both Feigenbaum and Freund and Sornette et al.
also looked at randomly selected time widows in the real data and generally found no evidence of log-
periodicity in these windows unless they were looking at a time period in which a crash was imminent”.
Is this not an important out-of-sample test? But Feigenbaum then turns a deaf ear to these results, adding
“[...] it is still not clear what, if any, conclusions can be drawn from them”!
Feigenbaum [2001] seriously misquotes our numerical experiment [Johansen et al., 2000b] testing
whether the null hypothesis that GARCH(1,1) with Student-distributed noise could explain the presence
†A trading strategy using put options was devised as an experimental test of the theory. Based on the prediction of the stock
market turmoil at the end of October 1997, a 400 % profit has been obtained in a two week period covering the mini-crash of Oct.
27 1997. The proof is available from a Merill Lynch client cash account release in Nov. 1997. See also the work by A.Minguet
et al. in H. Dupois Un krach avant novembre, Tendance 18, page 26 Sept. 1997.
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of log-periodicity. The statement that we “found no evidence in the simulated data of a linkage between
fits satisfying our criteria and ensuing crashes, in contrast to the linkage we report in the real data”
misrepresents our goals and results. In the 1000 surrogate data sets of length 400-weeks generated using
the GARCH(1,1) model with Student-distributed noise and analyzed as for the real crashes, we found
only two 400-weeks windows which qualified. This result corresponds to a confidence level of 99.8%
for rejecting the hypothesis that GARCH(1,1) with Student-distributed noise can generate meaningful
log-periodicity. There is no reference to a crash, the question is solely to test if log-periodicity of the
strength observed before 1929 and 1987 can be generated by one of the standard benchmark of financial
time series used intensively both by academics and practitioners. If in addition, we add that the two spells
of significant log-periodicity generated in the simulations using GARCH(1,1) with Student-distributed
noise were not following by crashes, then the case is even stronger for concluding that real markets
exhibit behaviors that are dramatically different from the one predicted by one of the most fundamental
benchmark of the industry! We note also that Feigenbaum’s remark that “the criteria used by Johansen
et al. would have rejected our best fit for the precursor to the 1987 crash” is misplaced: Feigenbaum and
Freund [1996] used the simpler one-frequency formula on a much narrower time window and the two
procedures can thus not be compared.
Feigenbaum’s remark, that “all these simulation results are weakened by the fact that each exper-
iment rules out only one possible data generating process”, is a truism: no truth is ever demonstrated
in science; the only thing that can be done is to construct models and reject them at a given level of
statistical significance. Those models, which are not rejected when pitting them against more and more
data progressively acquire the status of theory (think for instance of quantum mechanics which is again
and again put to tests). In the present context, it is clear that, in a purist sense, we shall never be able to
“prove” in an absolute sense the existence of a log-periodicity genuinely associated with specific market
mechanisms. The next best thing we can do is to take one by one the best benchmarks of the industry and
test them to see if they can generate the same structures as we document. If more and more models are
unable to “explain” the observed log-periodicity, this means that log-periodicity is an important “styl-
ized” fact that needs to be understood. This is what Feigenbaum and Freund [1996] have done using the
random walk paradigm and this is what we have done using the GARCH(1,1) with Student-distributed
noise industry standard. In his section 4, Feigenbaum changes his mind: “our main concern is whether
any apparent log-periodicity can be accounted for by a simple specification of the index’s behavior. A
random walk with drift would satisfy this purpose, and that is what we use.” Here, we can agree heartily!
It would of course be interesting to test more sophisticated models in the same way. However, we cau-
tion that rejecting one model after another will never prove definitively that log-periodicity exists. This
is outside the realm of statistical and econometric analysis.
Feigenbaum’s statement that “the frequency of crashes in Johansen et al.’s Monte Carlo simulations
was much smaller than the frequency of crashes in real data, so their Data Generating Process obviously
does not adequately capture the behavior of stock prices during a crash” falls in the same category. His
sentence implies that our test is meaningless while this is actually the opposite: again, if the most-used
benchmark of the industry is incapable of reproducing the observed frequency of crashes, this indeed
means that there is something to explain that may require new concepts and methods, as we propose.
In his section 4, Feigenbaum examines the first differences for the logarithm of the S&P 500 from
1980 to 1987 and finds that he cannot reject the log-periodic component ∆f2 at the 95% level: in plain
words, this means that the probability that the log-periodic component results from chance is about or
less than 0.05. This is an interesting result that complements our previous investigations. In contrast,
he finds that the pure power tern ∆f1 has a probability of about 30% to be generated by chance alone
and he attributes this to the weakness of its justification. We disagree: in our derivation [Sornette and
Johansen, 1997], the f1 term plays the same role as the f2 term in the Landau-Ginzburg expansion. The
origin of the lack of strong statistical significance of this term ∆f1 results rather, in our opinion, from the
intrinsic difficulty in quantifying a trend and an acceleration in very noisy data. This was for instance
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shown in another noisy data associated with the Kobe earthquake [Johansen et al., 1996] for which a
pure power law could absolutely not be fitted without fixing tc (the fitting algorithm could not converge
to a tc > tlast where tlast is the timing of the last data point) while an exponential or a log-periodic
power law could be fitted to the data.
Feigenbaum concludes his statistical section 4 by suggesting that an integrated process, like a random
walk which sums up random innovations over time, can generate log-periodic patterns. Actually, Huang
et al. [2000a] tested specifically the following problem: under what circumstances can an integrated
process produce spurious log-periodicity? The answer obtained after lengthy and thorough Monte-Carlo
tests is twofold. (a) For approximately regularly sampled time series as is the case of the financial
time series, taking the cumulative function of a noisy log-periodic function destroys the log-periodic
signal! (b) Only when sampling rates increase exponentially or as a power law of tc − t can spurious
log-periodicity in integrated processes be observed.
10 The issue of prediction
10.1 Addressing Feigenbaum’s criticisms
The determination of the parameters in a power law B(tc − t)β is very sensitive to noise and to the
distance from tc of the data used in the estimation. This is well-known by experimentalists and numerical
scientists working on critical phenomena in condensed matter physics who have invested considerable
efforts in developing reliable experiments that could probe the system as close as possible to the critical
point tc, in order to get reliable estimations of tc and β. A typical rule of thumb is that an error of less
than 1% in the determination of tc can lead to tenth of percent errors in the estimation of the critical
exponent β. We stress here that the addition of the log-periodic component improves significantly the
determination of tc as the fit can “lock-in” on the oscillations. This is what we have repeatedly shown in
our various applications of log-periodicity (see first section).
It is in this context that the following report of Feigenbaum should be analyzed: “excluding the last
year of data, the log-periodic component is no longer statistically significant. Furthermore, the best fit
in this truncated data set predicts a crash in June of 1986, shortly after the data set ends but well before
the actual crash”. This is not surprising in view of what we just recalled: it is as if a worker on critical
phenomena was trying to get a reliable estimation of tc and β by thrashing the last 15% of the data,
which are of course the most relevant. But trying to test log-periodicity, one cannot but conclude that
Feigenbaum is throwing the baby out with the bath. To be constructive, we offer the following clues. (i)
We would have rejected the fit shown in table 3 [Feigenbaum, 2001] as the value of ∆t = 1285 years
is meaningless. We would have concluded that a prediction so much in advance is not warranted. (ii)
In those cases where we either made an ex-ante announcement [Johansen and Sornette, 1997; 1999c] or
reported afterward a prediction experiment [Johansen and Sornette, 2000b; 2000c] (see also [Vandewalle
et al., 1998b]), the predictions used data ending within a few months at most from the actual tc. Again,
it is all too easy to reject an hypothesis by naively applying it outside its domain of application. It is
true that we had not stated a precise methodology for predicting crashes or strong corrections on the
basis of log-periodic signals in our previous papers. This should not be understood as meaning that
the model should be applied blindly and that it should be rejected as soon as there is a failure! Our
purpose has been and is still to explore the possibility of a novel remarkable signatures of the collective
behavior of investors. Our work suggests the existence of a cooperative behavior of investors, leading
to a fundamental ripening of the markets toward an instability. Our work suggests the possibility of
using the proposed framework to predict when the market will exhibit a crash/major correction. Our
analysis not only points to a predictive potential but also that false alarms are difficult to avoid due to
the underlying nature of speculative bubbles. This should not however be the main emphasis as this will
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distract from the fundamental issues.
10.2 The example of the Hong Kong crashes
In order to test the potential of the log-periodic power law formula and our numerical procedures with
respect to predicting crashes and large corrections, the Hang-Seng index was fitted from ≈ 1980 to
≈ 1999 in segments of ≈ 1.5 years, see figure 13. For each new fit, the start and end points of the time
interval used in the fit were simultaneously moved forward in time in steps of 5 points corresponding to
a fit every new trading week.
Previous results [Johansen et al., 1999] have shown that, for the major financial markets, the values
of the two physical variables, the exponent β and the angular log-frequency ω, are subject to constraints.
Specifically, we have found that the price prior to large crashes and corrections obeys the log-periodic
power law formula with 0.1 < β < 0.8 and 6 < ω < 9 (with the possible existence of harmonics).
The constraint on ω is documented in figure 1, which shows the Lomb periodogram of the log-periodic
component of the Hang-Seng price index for the eight bubbles observed in figure 13, ending in Oct.
1971, in Feb, 1973, in Sept. 1978, in Oct. 1980, in April 1989, in Nov. 1980, in Oct. 1987, in Jan. 1994
and in Oct. 1997. It is striking that the log-periodic spectra of all eight bubbles peak basically at the same
log-frequency f = 1.1 ± 0.3 (±0.2 if we exclude the first two bubbles), corresponding to an angular
frequency 5.0 ≤ ω = 2πf ≤ 8.8. In addition, sub-harmonics (half log-frequency) and harmonics 2f
can be seen. For completeness and for the sake of comparison, figure 2 shows the log-periodic spectra
for all the major bubbles ending in crashes on the Dow Jones and SP500 indices in the twentieth century.
Observe that the sub-harmonics (half log-frequency) and two harmonics 2f and 3f are quite strong in a
few of the data sets. Figure 3 shows the log-periodic spectra for the major bubbles on currencies, with
similar conclusions.
For prediction purpose, an additional technical constraint we may impose on a fit in order for it to
qualify as an alarm is that B should be negative (because we are looking for a bubble ending in a crash.
Specifically, this criterion disqualifies Feigenbaums “1974 case”.). Last, a fit should not qualify as an
alarm if it does not belong to a “cluster” of qualifying fits, i.e., a relative small change in the start and
end dates for the time-interval used should not alter the result.
It is necessary to decide on a horizon for the search with respect to the timing of the end of the
bubble. Since we are looking for an impending crash along the time series, the search for tc started
between one week and ≈ 0.2 years after the last date in the data set. However, tc is not fixed and is one
of the parameters determined in the fitting procedure.
Alarms was produced in the following nine time intervals containing the date of the last point used
in the fit:
1. 1981.60 to 1981.68. This was followed by a ≈ 30% decline.
2. 1984.36 to 1984.41. This was followed by a ≈ 30% decline.
3. 1985.20 to 1985.30. False alarm.
4. 1987.66 to 1987.82. This was followed by a ≈ 50 % decline.
5. 1989.32 to 1989.38. This was followed by a ≈ 35 % decline.
6. 1991.54 to 1991.69. This was followed by a ≈ 7%1 single day decline. Considered a false alarm,
nevertheless.
7. 1992.37 to 1992.58. this was followed by a ≈ 15% decline. This is a marginal case.
8. 1993.79 to 1993.90. This was followed by a ≈ 20% decline. This can also be considered as a
marginal case, if we want to be conservative.
9. 1997.58 to 1997.74. This was followed by ≈ 35% decline.
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We end up with two to four false alarms and seven to five correct predictions. Note that the alarms do
not depend on whether tc is correctly estimated or not. In order to include the timing of the crash/large
correction, the size of the data interval must be adapted in each particular case. In addition, there is
a clearly identifiable miss by our procedure, namely the ≈ 25 % decline of July-August 1990. The
large majority of the other large declines not identified by the procedure belongs to the turbulent periods
following the ones identified.
10.3 Statistical confidence of the crash “roulette”
What is the statistical significance of a prediction scheme that made at least five correct predictions,
issued at most four false alarms and missed at least one event?
To formulate the problem precisely, we divide time in bimonthly intervals and ask what is the prob-
ability that a crash or strong correction occurs in a given two-month interval. Let us consider N such
two-month intervals. The period over which we carried out our analysis goes from Jan. 1980 to Dec.
1999, corresponding to N = 120 two-months. In these N = 120 time intervals, nc = 6 + x crashes
occurred while N − nc = 114 − x bimonthly period were without crash, where we allow for x > 0 to
check the sensitivity of the statistical confidence to the definition and thus detection of crash or strong
corrections. Over this 20-year time interval, we made r = 9 predictions and k = 5 of them where
successful while r − k = 4 were false alarms. What is the probability Pk to have such a success from
chance?
This question has a clear mathematical answer and reduces to a well-known combinatorial problem
leading to the so-called Hypergeometric distribution. The solution of this problem is given in Appendix
B for completeness.
In the case of interest here, we plug in the formula given in the Appendix B the following numbers:
the number of bimonthly periods is N = 120, the number of real crashes is nc = 6 + x, the number of
correct predictions is (conservatively) k = 5, N − nc = 114 − x, the total number of issued prediction
is r = 9 and the number of false alarms is r − k = 4. For x = 0, the corresponding probability for this
scenario to result from chance is Pk=5(x = 0) = 3.8 · 10−6.
If we add the possibility for another missed event, this leads to a number of real crashes equal to
nc = 7, the number of correct predictions is still (conservatively) k = 5, the number of bimonthly
periods without crash is N − nc = 113, the total number of issued prediction is still r = 9 and the
number of false alarms is still r − k = 4. The corresponding probability for this scenario to result from
chance is Pk=5(x = 1) = 1.3 · 10−5.
Even with x = 5 additional missed events, the probability that our five successful predictions result
from chance remains very low. In this case, nc = 11, the number of correct predictions is still (conser-
vatively) k = 5, the number of bimonthly periods without crash is N − nc = 109, the total number of
issued prediction is still r = 9 and the number of false alarms is still r − k = 4. The corresponding
probability for this scenario to result from chance is Pk=5(x = 5) = 2.5 · 10−4.
We conclude that this track record, while containing only a few cases, is highly suggestive of a
real significance. We should stress that this contrasts with the naive view that five successes and four
false alarms and a few missed events, would corresponds approximately to one chance in two to be
right, giving the impression that the prediction skill is no better than deciding that a crash will occur
by random coin tosses. This conclusion would be very naive because it forgets an essential element
of the forecasting approach, which is to identify a (short) time window (two month) in which a crash
is probable: the main difficulty in making a prediction is indeed to identify the few bimonthly periods
among the 120 in which there is the risk of a crash. We note that these estimations remain robust when
changing the time windows by large variations.
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10.4 Using crash predictions
In evaluating predictions and their impact on (investment) decisions, one must weight the relative cost of
false alarms with respect to the gain resulting from correct predictions. The Neyman-Pearson diagram,
also called the decision quality diagram, is used in optimizing decision strategies with a single test
statistic. The assumption is that samples of events or probability density functions are available both
for the correct signal (the crashes) and the background noise (false alarms); a suitable test statistics is
then sought which distinguishes between the two in an optimal fashion. Using a given test statistics
(or discriminant function), one can introduce a cut which separates an acceptance region (dominated by
correct predictions) from a rejection region (dominated by false alarms). The Neyman-Pearson diagram
plots contamination (mis-classified events, i.e., classified as predictions which are thus false alarms)
against losses (mis-classified signal events, i.e., classified as background or failure-to-predict), both as
fractions of the total sample. An ideal test statistic corresponds to a diagram where the “Acceptance
of prediction” is plotted as a function of the “acceptance of false alarm” in which the acceptance is
close to 1 for the real signals, and close to 0 for the false alarms. Different strategies are possible: a
“liberal” strategy favors minimal loss (i.e. high acceptance of signal, i.e., almost no failure to catch the
real events but many false alarms), a “conservative” one favors minimal contamination (i.e., high purity
of signal and almost no false alarms). Molchan [1990, 1997] has reformulated this Neyman-Pearson
diagram into an “error diagram” which plots the rate of failure-to-predict (the number of missed events
divided by the total number of events in the total time interval) as a function of the rate of time alarms
(the total time of alarms divided by the total time, in other words the fraction of time we declare that
a crash is looming). The best predictor corresponds to a point close to the origin in this diagram, with
almost no failure-to-predict and with a small fraction of time declared as dangerous: in other words, this
ideal strategy misses no event and does not declare false alarms! The correspondence with the Neyman-
Pearson diagram is acceptance of signal = 1/(1-rate of failure) and acceptance of background = 1/(1-rate
of false alarms). These considerations teach us that making a prediction is one thing, using it is another
which corresponds to solving a control optimization problem [Molchan, 1990; 1997].
Indeed, suppose that a crash prediction is issued stating that a crash will occur x weeks from now.
At least three different scenarios are possible [Johansen and Sornette, 2000b]:
• Nobody believes the prediction which was then futile and, assuming that the prediction was cor-
rect, the market crashes. One may consider this as a victory for the “predictors” but as we have
experienced in relation to our quantitative prediction of the change in regime of the Nikkei index
[Johansen and Sornette, 1999c] (see figure 14 for an up-to-date assessment of this prediction),
this would only be considered by some critics just another “lucky one” without any statistical
significance (see [Johansen and Sornette, 2000c] for an alternative Bayesian approach).
• Everybody believes in the warning, which causes panic and the market crashes as consequence.
The prediction hence seems self-fulfilling.
• Enough believe that the prediction may be correct and take preemptive actions which make he
steam go off the bubble. The prediction hence disproves itself.
None of these scenarios are attractive from a practical point of view. In the first two, the crash is
not avoided and in the last scenario the prediction disproves itself and as a consequence the theory looks
unreliable. This seems to be the inescapable lot of scientific investigations of systems with learning and
reflective abilities, in contrast with the usual inanimate and unchanging physical laws of nature. Further-
more, this touches the key-problem of scientific responsibility. Naturally, scientists have a responsibility
to publish their findings. However, when it comes to the practical implementation of those findings in
society, the question becomes considerably more complex, as numerous historical and modern instances
have shown us.
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11 Are large drawdowns outliers?
11.1 A first cautionary remark on testing drawdown outliers
A drawdown is defined as a persistent decrease in the price over consecutive days. A drawdown is thus
the cumulative loss from the last maximum to the next minimum of the price. Drawdowns embody
a rather subtle dependence since they are constructed from runs of the same sign variations. Their
distribution thus captures the way successive drops can influence each other and construct in this way a
persistent process. This persistence is not measured by the distribution of returns because, by its very
definition, it forgets about the relative positions of the returns as they unravel themselves as a function of
time by only counting their frequency. This is not detected either by the two-point correlation function,
which measures an average linear dependence over the whole time series, while the dependence may
only appear at special times, for instance for very large runs, a feature that will be washed out by the
global averaging procedure.
Figure 15 shows the complementary cumulative distribution of the (absolute value of the) drawdowns
for the Dow Jones Industrial Average index from 1900.00 to 2000.34, of the S&P500 index from 1940.91
to 2000.34 and of the NASDAQ index from 1971.10 to 2000.30. The question is whether the upward
curvature seen for these three indices qualifies a change of regime.
In his section 5, Feigenbaum attempts to show that our detection [Johansen and Sornette, 1988b;
2001b] of two populations of drawdowns does not survive his testing procedure. His argument is
twofold: (i) the exponential and stretched-exponential null hypotheses are rejected at the 95% confidence
level and (ii) a modified stretched exponential distribution appears to fit the distribution of drawdowns,
including the 1987 crash. This second point is misleading as his table 10 shows only that the coefficients
of his model are necessary, not that it is a good model. Following his own procedure, he should have
included an additional term such as a d3/2 in the exponential and asked whether the null-hypothesis that
the coefficient of this new term is zero is rejected. Furthermore, the t-test is too weak in general to detect
the impact of one or a few outliers. Thus, the fact that his inclusion of the 1987 crash drawdown does
not change significantly the statistics does not mean anything.
Actually, testing for “outliers” or more generally for a change of population in a distribution is
a subtle problem, that escaped the attention of even some of our cleverest colleagues for some time
and is still overlooked by many others. This subtle point is that the evidence for outliers and extreme
events does not require and is not even synonymous in general with the existence of a break in the
distribution of the drawdowns. Let us illustrate this pictorially by borrowing from another domain of
active scientific investigation, namely the search for the understanding of the complexity of eddies and
vortices in turbulent hydrodynamic flows, such as in mountain rivers or in the weather. Since solving
the exact equations of these flows does not provide much insight as the results are forbidding, a useful
line of attack has been to simplify the problem by studying simple toy models, such as so-called “shell”
models of turbulence, that are believed to capture the essential ingredient of these flows, while being
amenable to analysis. Such “shell” models replace the three-dimensional spatial domain by a series
of uniform onion-like spherical layers with radii increasing as a geometrical series 1, 2, 4, 8, ..., 2n and
communicating with each other mostly with nearest neighbors.
As for financial returns, a quantity of great interest is the distribution of velocity variations between
two instants at the same position or between two points simultaneously. Such a distribution for the
square of the velocity variations has been calculated [L’vov et al., 2001] and exhibits an approximate
exponential drop-off as well as a co-existence with larger fluctuations, quite reminiscent of our findings
in finance [Johansen and Sornette, 1988b; 2001b] and of figure 11 in [Feigenbaum, 2001]. Usually, such
large fluctuations are not considered to be statistically significant and do not provide any specific in-
sight. Here, it turns out that it can be shown that these large fluctuations of the fluid velocity correspond
to intensive peaks propagating coherently over several shell layers with a characteristic bell-like shape,
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approximately independent of their amplitude and duration (up to a re-scaling of their size and duration).
When extending these observations to very long times so that the anomalous fluctuations can be sam-
pled much better, one gets a continuous distribution [L’vov et al., 2001]. Naively, one would expect that
the same physics apply in each shell layer (each scale) and, as a consequence, the distributions in each
shell should be the same, up to a change of unit reflecting the different scale embodied by each layer. It
turns out that the three curves for three different shells can indeed by nicely collapsed, but only for the
small velocity fluctuations, while the large fluctuations are described by very different heavy tails. Al-
ternatively, when one tries to collapse the curves in the region of the large velocity fluctuations, then the
portions of the curves close to the origin are not collapsed at all and are very different. The remarkable
conclusion is that the distributions of velocity increment seem to be composed of two regions, a region
of so-called “normal scaling” and a domain of extreme events. The theoretical analysis of L’vov et al.
[2001] further substantiate the fact that the largest fluctuations result from a different mechanism.
Here is the message that comes out of this discussion: the concept of outliers and of extreme events
does not rest on the requirement that the distribution should not be smooth. Noise and the very process
of constructing the distribution will almost always smooth out the curves. What is found by L’vov et
al. [2001] is that the distribution is made of two different populations, the body and the tail, which
have different physics, different scaling and different properties. This is a clear demonstration that this
model of turbulence exhibits outliers in the sense that there is a well-defined population of very large
and quite rare events that punctuate the dynamics and which cannot be seen as scale-up versions of the
small fluctuations.
As a consequence, the fact that the distribution of small events might show up some curvature or
continuous behavior does not tell anything against the outlier hypothesis. It is essential to keep this point
in mind in looking at the evidence presented below for the drawdowns.
Other groups have recently presented supporting evidence that crash and rally days significantly dif-
fer in their statistical properties from the typical market days (Lillo and Mantegna, 2000). For instance,
Lillo and Mantegna investigated the return distributions of an ensemble of stocks simultaneously traded
in the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) during market days of extreme crash or rally in the period
from January 1987 to December 1998. Out of two hundred distributions of returns, one for each of two
hundred trading days where the ensemble of returns is constructed over the whole set of stocks traded
on the NYSE, anomalous large widths and fat tails are observed specifically on the day of the crash
of Oct. 19 1987, as well as during a few other turbulent days. Lillo and Mantegna document another
remarkable behavior associated with crashes and rallies, namely that the distortion of the distributions of
returns are not only strong in the tails describing large moves but also in their center. Specifically, they
show that the overall shape of the distributions is modified in crash and rally days. Closer to our claim
that markets develop precursory signatures of bubbles of long time scales, Mansilla (2001) has also
shown, using a measure of relative complexity, that time sequences corresponding to “critical” periods
before large market corrections or crashes have more novel informations with respect to the whole price
time series than those sequences corresponding to periods where nothing happened. The conclusion is
that the intervals where no financial turbulence is observed, that is, where the markets works fine, the
informational contents of the (binary-coded) price time series is small. In contrast, there seems to be
significant information in the price time series associated with bubbles. This finding is consistent with
the appearance of a collective herding behavior modifying the texture of the price time series compared
to normal times.
In order to make further progress, we present three statistical tests that complement each other and
strengthen our claim that very large drawdowns are outliers.
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11.2 Surrogate data analysis
Reshuffling the distributions of returns provides a powerful tool for qualifying the existence of higher
order correlations in the drawdown distributions. We have reshuffled 10,000 times the daily returns of
the Nasdaq Composite index since its establishment 1971 until 18 April 2000. We have thus generated
10,000 synthetic data sets [Johansen and Sornette, 2000b]. This procedure means that the synthetic data
will have exactly the same distribution of daily returns as the real data. However, higher order correla-
tions apparently present in the largest drawdowns are destroyed by the reshuffling. This surrogate data
analysis of the distribution of drawdowns has the advantage of being non-parametric, i.e., independent
of the quality of fits with a model such as the stretched exponential or the power law. The draw-back is
that this kind of bootstrap analysis is “negative”, i.e., we use these tests to reject a given null-hypothesis,
not to confirm a given hypothesis.
Out of the 10,000 synthetic data sets, 776 had a single drawdown larger than 16.5%, 13 had two
drawdowns larger than 16.5%, 1 had three drawdowns larger than 16.5% and none had 4 (or more)
drawdowns larger than 16.5% as in the real data. This means that given the distribution of returns, by
chance we have a ≈ 8% probability of observing a drawdowns larger than 16.5%, a ≈ 0.1% prob-
ability of observing two drawdowns larger than 16.5% and for all practical purposes zero probability
of observing three or more drawdowns larger than 16.5%. Hence, the probability that the largest four
drawdowns observed for the Nasdaq could result from chance is less than 0.01%. As a consequence we
are lead to conclude that the largest market events are to be characterized by the presence of higher order
correlations in contrast to what is observed during “normal” times.
11.3 GARCH Analysis
Another approach is to use the GARCH(1,1) model discussed above with Student distribution of the
noise with 4 degrees of freedom fitted to the Dow Jones Industrial Average. The model allows us to
generate synthetic time series that capture the main stylized facts of financial time series. The appendix
recalls for completeness how these synthetic time series are generated.
¿From such synthetic price time series, we construct the distribution of drawdowns following ex-
actly the same procedure as in the analysis of the real time series. Figure 16 shows two continuous lines
defined such that 95% of the drawdowns of synthetic GARCH(1,1) with noise student distribution are
within the two lines: there is thus a 2.5% probability that a drawdown in a GARCH(1,1) time series with
Student distribution of the noise with 4 degrees of freedom falls above the upper line or below the lower
line. Notice that the distribution of drawdowns from the synthetic GARCH model is approximately expo-
nential or slightly sub-exponential for drawdowns up to about 10% and fits well the empirical drawdown
distribution shown as the symbols + for the Dow Jones index. However, the three largest drawdowns are
clearly above the upper line. We conclude that GARCH(1,1) dependencies, notwithstanding the correct
fat-tailness of the distribution of returns, can not (fully) account for the dependence observed in real data,
in particular in the special dependence associated with very large drawdowns. This illustrates that one
of the most used benchmarks in finance fails to match the data with respect to the largest drawdowns.
This novel piece of evidence, adding upon the previous rejection of the null hypothesis that reshuf-
fled time series exhibit the same drawdowns as the real time series, strengthens the claim that large
drawdowns are outliers. We can of course never “prove” that large drawdowns are outliers, but we can
make the case stronger and stronger by rejecting more and more null hypothesis. Up to now, we have
rejected the reshuffled data null hypotheses and the GARCH null hypothesis.
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11.4 Maximum Likelihood Analysis
We now turn to another test formulated in the same spirit as done by Feigenbaum, which is aimed at
the question whether there is a threshold quantile below which the null stretched exponential cannot
be rejected and beyond which it can. If this threshold quantile corresponds to say 5% of the largest
drawdowns, this suggests that most (95% to be specific) of the drawdowns are correctly modeled by the
stretched exponential while the 5% largest belong to a different distribution. We now present such a test.
First, let us recall the general framework of hypothesis testing within a parametric formulation.
Suppose, the sample of drawdowns X1, ...,Xn has a probability density distribution (pdf) p(x|a), where
a is some vector corresponding to the set of free parameters in the pdf. In our case, this corresponds to
taking the cumulative distribution
P (x|a) = P (x = 0) exp
[
−Bxz + Cx2z
]
, (11)
where a = (B,C, z). The “pure” stretched exponential distribution corresponds hence to the case where
C = 0. The choice of this parameterization (11) with a correction Cx2z where the exponent is twice
that of the first term in the exponential is taken (1) to avoid introducing two additional parameters and
(2) as the natural measure of a curvature in the log-linear plot of lnP versus xz that would qualify the
simple stretched exponential as a straight line.
In general, one considers two hypotheses corresponding to two sets of parameters a = (a1, ..., ak):
1. H1: a1, ..., ak belong to some k-dimensional interval I1 (an infinite dimensional parameter space
is possible as well).
2. H0: one of the parameter a1, ..., ak is equal to zero, say a1 = 0 whereas the other parameters
a2, ..., ak can vary in the same (k − 1)D-interval as in H1 (more generally H0 may assume that
several parameters are zero, say, a1 = 0, ..., am = 0,m < k). We denote this subset in parameter
space as I0. Evidently, the interval I1 contains the interval I0.
Let us denote the maximum likelihood under Hi as Li, i = 0, 1:
L0 = MAX0 [p(X1|a)..p(Xn|a)] (12)
where ‘MAX0’ is taken over a in the parametric interval I0, and
L1 = MAX1 [p(X1|a)...p(Xn|a)] (13)
where ‘”MAX1” is taken over a in the parametric interval I1. By construction, L0 ≤ L1 since adding
one or several parameters cannot decrease the quality of the fit to the data. A theorem by Wilks [Rao,
1965] states that, asymptotically as n tends to infinity, the ratio
T = −2 log L0
L1
(14)
is distributed as Chi-square with one degree of freedom (with m degrees of freedom in the more general
case of m parameters with a fixed value).
In order to qualify the existence of outliers in the drawdown distributions for the DJIA, SP500 and
the NASDAQ indices, we have performed a maximum likelihood analysis tailored to estimate the sig-
nificance of the curvature seen in the distributions. We define
PSE(x) = ASE(u) exp (−Bxz) (15)
PMSE(x) = AMSE(u) exp
(
−Bxz + Cx2z
)
(16)
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as two complementary cumulative distribution functions of drawdowns defined in a given interval
[0, u]. Hence the corresponding density distribution functions are pSE(x) = −dPSE(x)/dx and
pMSE(x) = −dPMSE(x)/dx. The subscripts SE and MSE stand for “stretched exponential” and
“modified stretched exponential” respectively. Note that the normalizing factors ASE(u) and AMSE(u)
are different and function of the upper cut-off u since pSE(x) and pMSE(x) must be normalized
to 1 in the interval [0, u]. This normalization condition gives ASE = 1/[1 − exp (−Buz)] and
AMSE = 1/[1 − exp
(−Buz + Cu2z)].
Technically, the maximum likelihood determination of the best parameters of the modified stretched
exponential model PMSE(x) defined by (16) is done as a minimization of
− ln (L) = −
N∑
i=1
ln p (Xi) =
N∑
i=1
(
− lnAMSE(u)− ln
(
BzXz−1i − 2zCX2z−1i
)
+BXzi − CX2zi
)
(17)
with respect to the parameters B,C and z, using the downhill simplex minimization algorithm [Press
et al. , 1992], and similarly for the stretched exponential model PSE(x) defined by (15). In order to
secure that the MLE indeed retains the parameter values of the global maximum, the downhill simplex
minimization algorithm uses a wide range of start values in the search.
Thus, for each distribution of drawdowns up to a given cut-off u, we perform a MLE of the param-
eters B and z for PSE(x) defined by (15) and of B,C and z for PMSE(x) defined by (16). We ask
whether we can reject the hypothesis that C = 0. This test is based on the T-statistics comparing H0 and
H1 defined by (14): if T is large, L1 is significantly larger than L0 which means that adding the param-
eter C 6= 0 improves significantly the quality of the fit. Hence, the pure stretched exponential model has
to be rejected as mis-specified. If, on the other hand, T is small, L1 is not much larger than L0 which
means that adding the parameter C 6= 0 does not improve much the fit. The stretched exponential can
be accepted as an adequate model, compared to the alternative specification allowing for a curvature in
the lnN versus xz representation. This procedure will qualify the existence of outliers if the hypothesis
C = 0 cannot be rejected if u is smaller than say 5% while it can be rejected for larger values of u.
Table 1 shows the results of this test for the Nasdaq composite index. We observe that the hypothesis
H0 that C = 0 cannot be rejected for a cut-off u = 3% corresponding to 87% of the total number of
drawdowns. For u = 3%, the probability that C = 0 is as high as 20.5%, which qualifies the stretched
exponential model. However, for u = 6%, i.e., 97% of the total data set, the SE model is rejected at
the 95% confidence level but not at the 99% level. Using the confidence level of 99%, the SE model
is rejected only for u = 12% and larger. This suggests that the SE is an adequate representation of the
distribution of drawdowns of the Nasdaq composite index for drawdowns of amplitudes less than about
10% at the 99% confidence level, i.e., 99% of total number of drawdowns is described correctly by the
SE. Larger drawdowns require a different model as there is a statistically significant upward curvature
detecting by our test. This test confirms our proposed picture of a change of regime between “normal”
drawdowns (about 99% of the total data set) of amplitude less than about 10% to “anomalous” large
drawdowns dubbed here “outliers” corresponding to about 1% of the total data set.
The situation is more murky for the SP500 index as shown in table 2. Here, already for the thresh-
old u = 3%, corresponding to 90% of the total number of drawdowns, we see that the SE model is
marginally rejected (or accepted) at the 99% confidence level. For larger thresholds u, the SE model is
strongly rejected. The SE model has thus much less descriptive power and the qualification of a change
of regime is less clear.
For the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) index, the results reported in table 3 indicate that
the hypothesis H0 that C = 0 cannot be rejected at the 95% confidence level for a cut-off u = 3%
corresponding to 87% of the total number of drawdowns. For u = 6%, i.e., 97% of the total data
set, the SE model is rejected at the 99% confidence level. This suggests that the SE is an adequate
representation of the distribution of drawdowns of the DJIA index for drawdowns of amplitudes less than
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about 3 − 5% at the 95% confidence level, i.e., about 90% of total number of drawdowns is described
correctly by the SE. Larger drawdowns require a different model as there is a statistically significant
upward curvature detecting by our test. This test again confirms our proposed picture of a change of
regime between “normal” drawdowns (about 90% of the total data set) of amplitude less than about
3−5% to “anomalous” large drawdowns dubbed here “outliers” corresponding to about 10% of the total
data set.
The conclusion that can be drawn from this analysis is that there is some support for our proposal
that large drawdowns are ‘outliers’ but the issue is made murky by the fact noticed also by Feigenbaum
that the exponential or stretched exponential model does not seem always to be a sufficiently good
model for the bulk of the distribution of drawdowns. We stress however that the exponential distribution
is the natural null hypothesis for uncorrelated returns, as shown in [Johansen et al., 2000b; Johansen
and Sornette, 2001b]. This actually seems to be born out approximately by our maximum likelihood
estimates of the exponent z of the stretched exponential model that determines it close to 1 both for
the S&P500 (see table 2) and the DJIA (see table 3) while z ≈ 0.9 for the Nasdaq index (see table 1).
However, the fact that that the exponential distribution is only expected asymptotically and the presence
of dependences in the returns make the detection of outliers less clear-cut.
Therefore, any statistical test such as the one we have presented on the possible existence of a change
of regime in the distribution of drawdowns is by construction a joint test of both the adequacy of the SE
model and of the change of regime. This is unfortunate because one may be led to reject the hypothesis
of a change of regime while actually it is the model of the bulk of the distribution which is rejected. To
circumvent this problem, we need non-parametric tests of a change of regime which are not dependent
on the specific choice such as the stretched exponential model used here. We will report on this approach
in a future communication.
12 Conclusion
In addition to offering a synthesis of all our past results, excluding crashes on emergent markets (see
Johansen and Sornette [2001a]), the main novel achievements of this paper include:
1. nine new crash cases and a presentation of the spectrum of logperiodicity on 20 major cases;
2. a general solution of the rational expectation model with arbitrary risk aversion quantified by an
arbitrary stochastic pricing kernel;
3. a report on systematic out-of-sample tests over 20 years of data on the Hong Kong index;
4. a precise mathematical assessment using probability theory of the statistical signicance of a run of
predictions using the “crash roulette”;
5. a novel maximum likelihood test of our previous proposal that large drawdowns are outliers.
As this paper has shown, there are many subtle issues associated with 1) the concept that crashes
are critical events and 2) that the dynamics of stock market prices develop specific log-periodic self-
similar patterns (see [Ide and Sornette, 2001] and [Gluzman and Sornette,2001] for recent theoretical
developments). Nothwithstanding 6 years of work and tens of papers, the problem is still in its infancy
and much remains to be done to understand and use these critical log-periodic patterns.
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Appendix A: GARCH(1,1)
The GARCH(1,1) model of a price time series xt is defined as follows.
xt = µ+ ǫt (18)
ǫt =
√
htzt (19)
ht = α+ βǫ
2
t−1 + γht−1 (20)
where zt is drawn from the Student distribution with κ = 4 degrees of freedom and mean 0 and unit
variance. Since the probability density function of the Student-t distribution is
t (x, κ) =
Γ
(
κ+1
2
)
Γ
(κ
2
)√
κπ
(
1 +
x2
κ
)−κ+1
2
, (21)
the likelihood function L of the scaled residual zt reads:
logL
T
= log
[
Γ
(
κ+ 1
2
)]
− log
[
Γ
(
κ
2
)]
− 1
2
log(κπ)
− κ+ 1
2T
T∑
t=1
[
log
(
1 +
ǫ2t
κht
)]
(22)
where Γ denotes the gamma function. The parameters of the GARCH(1,1) model are estimated using
the maximum likelihood method. With these parameters, the distribution of returns is well fitted by
the GARCH model. As shown in figure 16, the small and medium-size drawdowns are also reasonably
accounted for by the GARCH(1,1) model.
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Appendix B: The crash roulette problem
The “crash roulette” problem defined in section 10.3 is the same as the following game explained the
book of W. Feller (1971). In a population of N balls, nc are red and N − nc are black. A group of r
balls is chosen at random. What is the probability pk that the group so chosen will contain exactly k red
balls?
Denoting C(n,m) = n!/(m!(n −m)!, the number of distinct ways to choose m elements among n
elements, independently of the order with which we choose the m elements, we estimate the probability
pk. If, among the r chosen balls, there are k red ones, then there are r − k black ones. There are thus
C(nc, k) different ways of choosing the red balls and C(N − nc, r − k) different ways of choosing
the black balls. The total number of ways of choosing r balls among N is C(N, r). Therefore, the
probability pk that the group of r balls so chosen will contain exactly k red balls is the product C(nc, k)×
C(N −nc, r− k) of the number ways corresponding to the draw of exactly k red balls among r divided
by the total possible number C(N, r) of ways to draw the r ball (here we simply use the frequentist
definition of the probability of an event as the ratio of the number of states corresponding to that event
divided by the total number of events):
pk =
C(nc, k)× C(N − nc, r − k)
C(N, r)
. (23)
pk is the so-called Hypergeometric function. In order to quantify a statistical confidence, we must ask
a slightly different question: what is the probability Pk that, out of the r balls, there are at least k red
balls? Clearly, the result is obtained by summing pk over all possible values of k’s up to the maximum
of nc and r; indeed, the number of red balls among r cannot be greater than r and it cannot be greater
than the total number nc of available red balls.
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Figure 1: The Lomb periodogram of the log-periodic component of the Hang-Seng price index (Hong
Kong) for the 8 bubbles followed by crashes observed in figure 13, ending in Oct. 1971, in Feb, 1973, in
Sept. 1978, in Oct. 1980, in Oct. 1987, in April 1989, in Jan. 1994 and in Oct. 1997. See [Johansen et al.,
1999] for details on how to calculate the Lomb periodogram.
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Figure 2: Log-periodic spectra for all the major bubbles ending in crashes on the Dow Jones and SP500
index in the twentieth century as well as the Nasdaq crash of 2000. Observe that the sub-harmonics (half
log-frequency) and two harmonics 2f and 3f are quite strong in some of the data sets. See [Johansen et al.,
1999] for details on how to calculate the Lomb periodogram.
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Figure 3: Log-periodic spectra for the major recent bubbles on currencies. See [Johansen et al., 1999] for
details on how to calculate the Lomb periodogram.
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Figure 4: Yen versus Euro (expressed in DM) mini-crash (drop > 7%) of Jan 2000. The parameter values
of the fit with eq. 3 are A ≈ 0.021, B ≈ −0.0067, C ≈ 0.00048, β ≈ 0.45, tc ≈ 2000.0, φ ≈ −0.5 and
ω ≈ 5.7.
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Figure 5: US$ versus Euro (expressed in DM) crash (drop > 13%) of 2000. The parameter values of the
fit with eq. 3 are A ≈ 2.6, B ≈ −0.65, C ≈ −0.05, β ≈ 0.44, tc ≈ 2000.88, φ ≈ 0.0 and ω ≈ 7.3.
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Figure 6: Wall Street crash of 1937. The parameter values of the fit with eq. 3 are A ≈ 19.9, B ≈ −6.1,
C ≈ 1.1, β ≈ 0.56, tc ≈ 1937.19, φ ≈ 0.1 and ω ≈ 5.2.
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Figure 7: Wall Street crash of 1946. The parameter values of the fit with eq. 3 are A ≈ 21.5, B ≈ −6.3,
C ≈ −0.44, β ≈ 0.49, tc ≈ 1946.51, φ ≈ 1.4 and ω ≈ 7.2.
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Figure 8: Hong-Kong crash of 1989. The parameter values of the fit with eq. 3 are A ≈ 3515, B ≈ −1072,
C ≈ 225, β ≈ 0.57, tc ≈ 1989.46, φ ≈ 0.5 and ω ≈ 4.9.
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Figure 9: Hong-Kong crash of 1980. The parameter values of the fit with eq. 3 are A ≈ 2006, B ≈ −1286,
C ≈ −55.5, β ≈ 0.29, tc ≈ 1980.88, φ ≈ 1.8 and ω ≈ 7.2.
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Figure 10: Hong-Kong crash of 1978. The parameter values of the fit with eq. 3 are A ≈ 824, B ≈ −538,
C ≈ −28.0, β ≈ 0.40, tc ≈ 1978.69, φ ≈ −0.17 and ω ≈ 5.9.
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Figure 11: Hong-Kong crash of 1973. The parameter values of the fit with eq. 3 are A ≈ 10.8, B ≈ −5.0,
C ≈ −0.05, β ≈ 0.11, tc ≈ 1973.19, φ ≈ −0.05 and ω ≈ 8.7. Note that for this bubble, it is the logarithm
of the index which is used in the fit.
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
71.2 71.3 71.4 71.5 71.6 71.7 71.8 71.9
H
an
g-
Se
ng
Date
Figure 12: Hong-Kong crash of 1971. The parameter values of the fit with eq. 3 are A ≈ 569, B ≈ −340,
C ≈ 17, β ≈ 0.20, tc ≈ 1971.73, φ ≈ −0.5 and ω ≈ 4.3.
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Figure 13: The Hang-Seng composite index of the Hong Kong stock market from Nov. 1969 to Sept.
1999. First panel: linear scale; second panel: logarithmic scale in the vertical axis. The culmination of the
bubbles followed by strong corrections of crashes are indicated by the symbols ‘fl’ and correspond to the
times Oct. 1971, Feb, 1973, Sept. 1978, Oct. 1980, Oct. 1987, April 1989, Jan. 1994 and Oct. 1997. The
second panel with the index in logarithmic scale shows that it has grown exponentially on average at the
rate of ≈ 13.6% per year represented by the straight line corresponding to the best exponential fit to the
data. Eight large bubbles (among them 5 are very large) can be observed as upward accelerating deviations
from the average exponential growth. There are also smaller structures that we do not consider here.
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Figure 14: In early Jan. 1999, Johansen and Sornette (1999c) fitted the Japanese Nikkei index from 1
Jan 1990 to 31 Dec. 1998 with three log-periodic formula corresponding to successive improvements in a
Landau-expansion of the renormalization group formulation of a bubble: linear log-periodic formula (dotted
line), second-order nonlinear log-periodic formula (continuous line) and third-order nonlinear log-periodic
formula (dashed line). This last curve provided a good fit to the data from 1 Jan 1990 to 31 Dec. 1998.
We therefore used it to extrapole to the future. Our prediction announced in Jan. 1999 predicted that the
Japanese stock market should increase by about 50% as the year 2000 was approached, would culminate
and then decrease again. In this figure, the value of the Nikkei is represented as the dots for the data used
in the fits and as squares for the out-of-sample data (Jan. 1999 to May 2001). This figure is as in (Johansen
and Sornette, 1999c) except for the squares starting 3rd Jan. 1999 which represents the realized Nikkei
prices since the prediction was issued. The prediction turned out to correctly predict the level and time
of the maximum (20800 in April 2000). Since then, the quality of the extrapolation has deteriorated even
if the existence of a downward trend leading to another minimum was expected. The observed minimum
below 13000 in early March 2001 anticipated the extrapolation of the dashed curve. More nonlinear terms
should have been included to extend the prediction further in the future, as can be seen from the increasing
improvements of the log-periodic formulas as their nonlinear order increases. See [Johansen and Sornette,
2000c] for a quantitative evalution of this prediction.
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Figure 15: Complementary cumulative distribution of the (absolute value of the) drawdowns for the Dow
Jones Industrial Average index (+) from 1900.00 to 2000.34, S&P500 index (×) from 1940.91 to 2000.34
and the NASDAQ index (∗) from 1971.10 to 2000.30. The ordinate is in logarithmic scale while the abscissa
shows the absolute value of the drawdowns. The total number of drawdowns for the three index are 6486,
3363 and 1495, respectively.
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Figure 16: The two dashed lines are defined such that 99% of the drawdowns of synthetic GARCH(1,1)
with noise student distribution with 4 degrees of freedom are within the two lines. The symbols + represent
the cumulative distribution of drawdowns for the Dow Jones index. The ordinate is in logarithmic scale
while the abscissa shows the drawdowns: for instance, −0.30 corresponds to a drawdown of −30%.
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Cut-Off u quantile z ln (L0) ln (L1) T proba
3% 87% 0.916, 0.940 4890.36 4891.16 1.6 20.5%
6% 97% 0.875, 0.915 4944.36 4947.06 5.4 2.0%
9% 99.0% 0.869, 0.918 4900.75 4903.66 5.8 1.6%
12% 99.7% 0.851, 0.904 4872.47 4877.46 10.0 0.16%
15% 99.7% 0.843, 0.898 4854.97 4860.77 11.6 0.07%
18% 99.9% 0.836, 0.890 4845.16 4851.94 13.6 0.02%
Table 1: Nasdaq composite index. The total number af drawdowns is 1495. The first column is the cut-
off u such that the MLE of the two competing hypotheses (standard (SE) and modified (MSE) stretched
exponentials) is performed over the interval [0, u] of the absolute value of the drawdowns. The second
column gives the fraction ‘quantile’ of the drawdowns belonging to [0, u]. The third column gives the
exponents z found for the SE (first value) and MSE (second value) distributions. The fourth and fifth
columns give the logarithm of the likelihoods (12) and (13) for the SE and MSE, respectively. The sixth
column gives the variable T defined in (14). The last column ‘proba’ gives the corresponding probability
of exceeding T by chance. For u > 18%, we find that T saturates to 13.6 and ‘proba’ to 0.02%.
Cut-Off u quantile z ln (L0) ln (L1) T proba
3% 90% 1.05, 1.08 11438.55 11442.11 7.1 0.8%
6% 98.6% 0.981, 1.04 11502.00 11511.95 19.9 < 10−4%
9% 99.6% 0.971, 1.03 11441.17 11451.72 21.1 < 10−4%
12% 99.9% 0.960, 1.02 11405.89 11417.62 23.5 < 10−4%
15% 99.97% 0.956, 1.01 11394.67 11407.67 26.0 < 10−4%
Table 2: SP500 index. Same as table 1. The total number af drawdowns is 3363. For u > 15%, we find
that T saturates to 26 and ‘proba’ is less than 10−6.
Cut-Off u quantile z ln (L0) ln (L1) T proba
3% 87% 1.01, 1.04 21166.73 21168.46 3.5 6.1%
6% 97% 0.965, 1.01 21415.28 21424.00 17.4 0.003%
9% 99.3% 0.934, 0.992 21229.22 21248.65 38.9 < 10−4%
12% 99.8% 0.921, 0.982 21132.75 21157.04 48.6 < 10−4%
15% 99.9% 0.917, 0.977 21100.87 21126.13 50.5 < 10−4%
18% 99.9% 0.915, 0.973 21089.15 21114.08 49.9 < 10−4%
21% 99.95% 0.912, 0.966 21075.20 21100.88 51.5 < 10−4%
24% 99.97% 0.910, 0.957 21065.62 21090.57 49.9 < 10−4%
Table 3: DJIA index. Same as tables 1 and 2. The total number of drawdowns is 6486. For u > 24%, we
find that T saturates to 50 and ‘proba’ is less than 106.
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